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I.  Introduction 
 
 
1. In this paper we will consider in what way national courts are confronted with the 
application of European waste law. Since there are major differences in the organization and 
jurisdiction of the courts in the different Member States of the European Union, we have 
opted not to address this issue on the basis of our own national experience, but instead to take 
as our starting point the cases that have been referred by various courts in several Member 
States to the European Court of Justice. The Court of Justice has indeed the good practice of 
specifying in its judgements on questions referred to it for a preliminary ruling the context in 
which those questions were put. Although naturally there are far more cases where national 
courts apply European waste law than cases where questions are referred for a preliminary 
ruling1, this case-law nevertheless gives us a good and representative picture of the various 
circumstances in which national courts are confronted with European waste law. 
The case-law of the Court of Justice shows that the context in which questions are 
referred for a preliminary ruling can vary considerably. Besides the obvious cases where the 
court has to apply a Regulation, in this case Regulation (EEC) No. 259/93 on the supervision 
and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community (V), there 
are highly diverse cases where different European waste directives have to be applied in 
administrative (III) or criminal (II) cases. We will look into those cases in detail below. We 
know of only one civil case where it was necessary to consult the Court of Justice on the 
interpretation of European waste law (IV). 
 
 
1 It may indeed be assumed that many cases are settled by national courts without it being necessary to refer 
questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, either because the court was of the opinion that there is 
no reasonable doubt about the validity or interpretation of the provisions of European law relied upon (the so-
called “acte claire”), or because those questions could be solved on the basis of the existing case-law of the 
Court of Justice (so-called “acte éclairé”). This can be illustrated by the case-law of the Court of which I myself 
am a member. A total of 5 rulings were made in which European waste law was applied (rulings nos. 8/1995, 
10/1995, 19/1997, 159/2002 and 195/2004). In none of those cases did the Court consider it necessary to refer a 
question for a preliminary ruling (www.arbitrage.be). 
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II. The application of European waste law in criminal cases 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 
2. A first category of cases occasioning references for a preliminary ruling are criminal 
cases in which persons are being prosecuted for punishable breaches of national waste 
legislation. In such cases, the counsel for the defence may cite European waste law to secure 
an acquittal. It is contended that national waste law is contrary to European waste law, and 
that therefore national waste law should not be applied, which in turn should lead to an 
acquittal2. On the other hand, it may happen that there are questions of interpretation relating 
to national waste law and that those questions of interpretation can be traced back to questions 
of interpretation of European waste law of which the national provisions at issue constitute 
the transposition into domestic law. Such questions of interpretation can be decisive with 
regard to the question whether or not waste law has been breached and whether or not 
therefore punishable acts have been committed. The case-law of the Court also reveals that 
(Italian) criminal courts sometimes ask themselves whether a limitation of the scope of 
national waste law – and the often concomitant decriminalization of previously punishable 
acts – is not contrary to European waste law. Although such references for a preliminary 
ruling often allow the Court to interpret European waste law in a way that is useful to all 
parties concerned with the application of European waste law, it is often not clear what 
practical relevance those references for a preliminary ruling have for the criminal case in 
connection with which they are made. 
 
 
2.2. Cases in which the interpretation of the European Waste Directives is crucial to the 
interpretation of national implementation legislation 
 
 
3. The well-know Vessoso and Zanetti case3, in which the Court for the first time had the 
opportunity to rule on the definition of ‘waste’, as used in the original version of Directive 
75/442/EEC, concerned a reference for a preliminary ruling in a criminal case. The question 
concerning the interpretation of the term ‘waste’ arose in the context of two criminal 
prosecutions brought before the Prétura di Asti (Italy) against a number of haulage 
contractors who were charged with transporting substances on behalf of third parties without 
obtaining prior authorisation, thereby infringing a Decree of the President of the Italian 
Republic. That decree, with was adopted for the purpose of transposing the Framework Waste 
Directive (Directive 75/442/EEG) and the Toxic and Dangerous Waste Directive (Directive 
78/319/EEC) into national law, lays down penalties under criminal law for persons who 
transport or dispose of waste on behalf of third parties without obtaining the authorization of 
the competent Italian regional authority. In their defence, the defendants maintained that the 
 
2 We will not go into a full consideration of the case-law of the Court in connection with the original waste oil 
directive (see, among others, ECJ, 12 October 1993, Criminal proceedings against José Vanacker and André 
Lesage and SA Baudoux combustibles, Case C-37/92, ECR, 1993, I-4947; ECJ, 10 March 1983, Inter-Huiles, 
Case 172/82, ECR, 1983, 555) since, insofar as it concerns export-restricting measures, it has been superseded by 
Regulation (EC) No. 259/93 and the relevant case-law. 
3 ECJ, 28 March 1990, Criminal proceedings against G. Vessoso and G. Zanetti, Joined cases C-206/88 and C-
207/88, E.C.R., 1990, p. I-1461. 
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substances transported did not constitute waste within the meaning of the Presidential Decree. 
They claimed that in this case the substances transported were capable of economic 
reutilization and were not therefore abandoned or intended to be abandoned. In their view, 
since the activity to which the charges related did not fall within the scope of the Presidential 
Decree, the criminal penalties laid down therein were not applicable. The Pretura considered 
that, since the aim of the Presidential Decree was to transpose two European Waste 
Directives, it was bound to interpret the definition given in the Decree in a manner compatible 
with both Directives.  The Court answered that “[t]he concept of waste, within the meaning of 
Article 1 of Council Directive 75/442/EEC and Article 1 of Council Directive 78/319/EEC, is 
not to be understood as excluding substances and objects which are capable of economic 
reutilization [; t]he concept does not presume that the holder disposing of a substance or an 
object intends to exclude all economic reutilization of the substance or object by others.”  I 
have no knowledge of the judgment given by the national court subsequent to this preliminary 
ruling, although I assume that the counsel for the defence did not succeed since the Court 
shared the broad interpretation of the waste concept and the referring court of law probably 
gave a similar broad interpretation to the national definition. 
 
 
 
4. The context in which the Prétura di San Vito al Tagliamento (Italy) made a reference 
for a preliminary ruling in the Zanetti case4 of the same date is virtually the same. The counsel 
for the defence in that case held the view that what the accused had transported was not waste 
and that the Italian legislation was in certain respects contrary to the European Waste 
Directives by imposing more stringent demands. To the questions referred by the Prétura for a 
preliminary ruling, the Court answered, “(1) National legislation which defines waste as 
excluding substances and objects which are capable of economic reutilization is not 
compatible with Council Directives 75/442/EEC and 78/319/EEC. (2) National legislation 
which does not make the transport of waste covered by Council Directive 75/442/EEC subject 
to a system of prior authorization is compatible with Article 10 of that directive. However, the 
Member States may make the transport of waste covered by that directive subject to a system 
of prior authorization if they consider this necessary in order to achieve the aims of the 
directive. ( 3 ) The vesting in authorities which do not have competence at the national level 
of the power to issue authorizations for the transport of waste is compatible with Article 5 of 
Council Directive 75/442/EEC”.  Since the broad interpretation of the Italian legal definition 
of waste at the time was not found to be contrary to the European definition – and the reverse 
would be true – and the Italian legislation in those respects where it was more stringent than 
the Directives was not found to be contrary to the Directives in question either (since those 
directives are limited to a minimum harmonization), it may be assumed that the counsel for 
the defence did not succeed in this case either. 
 
 
 
5. The Gallotti case5 deals with references for a preliminary ruling from the Pretura 
circondariale di Roma (Italy). The questions were raised in criminal proceedings against 
various people accused of contravening Italian legislation on waste. Although the orders for 
 
4 ECJ, 28 March 1990, Criminal proceedings against E. Zanetti and Others, Case C-359/88, ECR, 1990, I-1509. 
5 ECJ, 12 September 1996, Criminal proceedings against Sandro Gallotti, Roberto Censi, Giuseppe Salmaggi, 
Salvatore Pasquire, Massimo Zappone, Francesco Segna and others, Cesare Cervetti, Mario Gasbarri, Isidoro 
Narducci and Fulvio Smaldone, Joined cases C-58/95, C-75/95, C-112/95, C-119/95, C-123/95, C-135/95, C-
140/95, C-141/95, C-154/95 and C-157/95, ECR, 1996, I –4345. 
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reference are not very clear in that respect, it seems that the main charges against the accused 
are setting up special waste tips without a permit, contrary to Article 10 of Presidential Decree 
No 915/82, disposing of waste without a permit, contrary to Article 25 thereof, and failing to 
comply with Articles 3 and 9 octies of Law No 475/88 relating to keeping waste records. In 
the orders for reference, the Pretore notes first of all that Directive 91/156 radically amended 
Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (OJ 1975 L 194, p. 39) by changing 
the definition of waste, encouraging recovery operations and setting as objectives the 
prevention and reduction of the amount of waste by means of technologies based on 
recycling, re-use and the production of energy. He concludes that the implementation of 
Directive 91/156 ought to lead to a radical change in Italian legislation whereby disposal 
operations will be distinguished from recovery operations which, in his view, should be 
subject to a less strict permit system. He notes, however, that the Italian legislature has not 
implemented Directive 91/156, although the time-limit for transposition expired on 1 April 
1993. Continuing his analysis, the Pretore points out that in Directive 91/156 the solution 
chosen seems to have been primarily, if not exclusively, an administrative system of waste 
control, restricting criminal-law controls to extreme cases. Accordingly, Presidential Decree 
No 915/82 is incompatible with the directive, in that criminal-law penalties predominate in its 
provisions on management and supervision. As a result, he concludes Italian operators are in a 
less favourable position than those in the rest of the Community, whereas the aim of the 
directive is to ensure that the internal market functions properly and to remove disparities in 
the treatment of operators in the single market through the adoption of uniform legislation.  
The questions raised by the Pretore are answered as follows by the Court: “Article 5 and the 
third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty must be interpreted as not precluding a 
Member State from imposing criminal penalties to ensure compliance with the obligations 
laid down by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 
75/442/EEC on waste, provided that those penalties are analogous to those applicable to 
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and are, in any event, 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” With this answer, the Court makes it clear that the 
obligations ensuing from European waste law are not such as to necessarily lead to the 
acquittal of the persons being prosecuted under criminal law. 
 
 
 
6. In the Van de Walle case6, too, the European waste legislation was put up as a defence 
by the accused. The reference was made by the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Belgium) in the 
course of proceedings brought against Mr Van de Walle, Mr Laurent and Mr Mersch, senior 
staff of Texaco Belgium SA, and against Texaco itself, who, as the result of an accidental leak 
of hydrocarbons from a service station under that company's sign, are charged with the 
offence of abandoning waste. The service station was covered by a commercial lease between 
Texaco and the owner of the premises. Since 1988 it had been operated by a manager under 
an operating agreement which provided that the land, building, equipment and movable 
property for the operation were made available to the manager by Texaco. The manager 
operated the service station on his own behalf but did not have the right to make changes to 
the premises without prior written permission from Texaco, which supplied the service station 
with petroleum products and, in addition, retained control over bookkeeping and supplies. 
Following the discovery of the hydrocarbon leak, which was the result of defects in the 
service station's storage facilities, Texaco took the view that the station could no longer 
continue to operate and decided to terminate the management contract in April 1993, alleging 
 
6 ECJ, 7 September 2004, Criminal proceedings against Paul Van de Walle, Daniel Laurent, Thierry Mersch 
and Texaco Belgium SA, Case C-1/03. 
 5
serious negligence on the part of the manager. It subsequently terminated the commercial 
lease in June 1993. Although disclaiming liability, Texaco proceeded to decontaminate the 
soil and replaced part of the storage facilities which gave rise to the hydrocarbon leak. It 
carried out no further activities on the site after May 1994. The Brussels Capital Region took 
the view that decontamination had not been completed and paid for other remedial measures 
which it considered necessary in order to carry out its building plan. Since Texaco's actions 
appeared to constitute infringements of the Order of 7 March 1991, and in particular Articles 
8, 10 and 22 thereof, proceedings were brought against Mr Van de Walle, Texaco's managing 
director, Mr Laurent and Mr Mersch, officers of the company, and Texaco as a legal entity 
before the Tribunal correctionnel (Criminal Court) of Brussels. The Brussels Capital Region 
claimed damages in those proceedings. By judgment of 20 June 2001, that court acquitted the 
defendants, exonerated Texaco and stated that it was not competent to rule on the application 
by the party claiming damages. The Ministère public (Public Prosecutor) and the party 
claiming damages appealed against that judgment before the court which has made the 
reference. That court took the view that Article 22 of the Order of 7 March 1991 imposed 
penalties for failure to comply with the obligations set out in Article 8 thereof and not for 
failure to comply with the requirements of Article 10. It therefore considered that in order to 
be subject to criminal sanctions under Article 22, the actions of the accused must constitute 
abandonment of waste within the meaning of Article 8. It observed that Texaco had not rid 
itself of its waste by supplying it to the service station and that neither the petrol delivered nor 
the tanks which remained buried in the ground after the decontamination activities carried out 
by that undertaking could constitute waste within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Order, 
that is to say, a substance or object which the holder discards or intends or is required to 
discard. The court was in doubt, however, as to whether subsoil contaminated as the result of 
an accidental spill of hydrocarbons could be considered waste and stated that it doubted that 
that classification was possible, since the land in question had not been excavated and treated. 
It also pointed out that legal opinion differs as to whether the accidental spill of a product 
which contaminates soil is comparable to the abandonment of waste. The questions referred 
by the Court of Appeal were answered as follows by the Court: “Hydrocarbons which are 
unintentionally spilled and cause soil and groundwater contamination are waste within the 
meaning of Article 1(a) of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as 
amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991. The same is true for soil 
contaminated by hydrocarbons, even if it has not been excavated. In circumstances such as 
those in the main proceedings, the petroleum undertaking which supplied the service station 
can be considered to be the holder of that waste within the meaning of Article 1(c) of 
Directive 75/442 only if the leak from the service station's storage facilities which gave rise to 
the waste can be attributed to the conduct of that undertaking.” This surprising answer – it is 
not all that straightforward to treat polluted soil as waste, especially not in Member States that 
have special legislation on soil remediation which contains rules that usually deviate from 
waste legislation – may result in an acquittal of the accused, insofar as it is not proved that the 
leak is the result of actions by Texaco itself. However, the case is still pending before the 
Court of Appeal in Brussels. 
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2.3. Limitation of the scope of the national legislation in breach of European regulations 
 
 
7. The questions referred for a preliminary ruling in the Tombesi case7 were raised in 
criminal proceedings pending before two Italian criminal courts, the Pretura Circondariale di 
Terni and the Pretura Circondariale di Pescara. In Case C-304/94 Euro Tombesi and Adino 
Tombesi were charged with the offence of discharging without authorization marble rubble 
and debris from marble. They were also charged with failing to keep the required records of 
loading and unloading and with making false declarations. In Case C-330/94 Roberto Santella 
was charged with producing without authorization toxic and dangerous waste, consisting of 
pitch obtained from the emissions produced by electro-static filters used in cooking ovens, to 
be disposed of by burning. Finally, in Case C-342/94 Giovanni Muzi and Others were charged 
with inter alia an offence concerning specific waste known as ‘sansa’ (olive oil residues). 
Before the Pretura Circondariale di Terni, the defendants in the main proceedings claimed that 
the substances and objects involved were no longer regarded as waste under rules introduced 
by a later legislative measure, which meant that the conduct complained of no longer 
constituted an offence.  The Pretura Circondariale di Terni considered that the urgent adoption 
of Decree Law No 530/94 was contrary to the applicable Community directives, in so far it 
removed an entire category of waste from the scope of the Italian and the Community 
legislation. Thereupon the court referred a number of questions for a preliminary ruling. 
In Case C-224/95 Anselmo Savini was charged with the offence of transporting 
without the authorization of the Region of Abruzzo special waste. Before the Pretore di 
Pescara Mr Savini claimed that, as a result of the adoption of a Decree-Law No 530/94, which 
excluded from the scope of DPR 915/82 the substances which had been transported, his 
conduct could not be penalized. The Pretore di Pescara considered that the combined 
provisions of Decree-Law  No 619/94 and the Decree of the Environment Minister of 5 
September 1994 removes all operations relating to the substances which they list from the 
scope of Italian legislation.  Entertaining doubts as to the compatibility of such exclusion with 
Community law, the Pretore di Pescara “suspended the proceedings and referred two 
questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling”. 
The Court gave the following answer to all those questions: “The concept of 'waste’ in 
Article 1 of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council 
Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991, referred to in Article 1(3) of Council Directive 
91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste and Article 2(a) of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste 
within, into and out of the European Community, is not to be understood as excluding 
substances and objects which are capable of economic reutilization, even if the materials in 
question may be the subject of a transaction or quoted on public or private commercial lists. 
In particular, a deactivation process intended merely to render waste harmless, landfill 
tipping in hollows or embankments and waste incineration constitute disposal or recovery 
operations falling within the scope of the abovementioned Community rules. The fact that a 
substance is classified as a re-usable residue without its characteristics or purpose being 
defined is irrelevant in that regard. The same applies to the grinding of a waste substance.” 
With this judgment it has become clear that the limitation of the scope of the Italian 
waste legislation was at odds with the requirements of the European Waste Directives and the 
above-mentioned Regulation. Although this judgment is of great significance for the 
 
7 ECJ, 25 June 1997, Criminal proceedings against Euro Tombesi and Adino Tombesi, Roberto Santella, 
Giovanni Muzi and Others, Anselmo Savini, Joined Cases C-304/94, C-330/94, C-342/94 and C-224/95. 
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interpretation of the European waste concept and is often quoted for that reason, it is not 
immediately clear in what respect the judgment of the Court of Justice has contributed to the 
settlement of the actual criminal cases in connection with which the questions were referred 
for a preliminary ruling. It follows from the absence of a direct effect of Directives recalled in 
the judgment - "it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law (see, in 
particular, Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, paragraph 36), a directive which has 
not been transposed may not create obligations for an individual and a provision of a 
directive may not therefore be relied upon as such against such a person" – that the fact that 
the Italian waste legislation was restricted in scope in a manner that is contrary to European 
waste law and the resulting decriminalization cannot be undone by relying upon the Directive.  
 
 
 
8.  The Saetti and Frediani case8 concerns questions raised by the Giudici per le indagini 
preliminari of the Tribunale di Gela (Italy) in the course of criminal proceedings against Mr 
Saetti and Mr Frediani, the director and former director respectively of the Gela oil refinery 
operated by AGIP Petroli SpA, who were accused inter alia of having failed to comply with 
Italian legislation on waste. As a result of complaints concerning petroleum refinery activities 
at Gela, the Public Prosecutor of the Tribunale di Gela had a technical survey carried out in 
the installation. That survey determined that the refinery was using petroleum coke, resulting 
from the refining of crude oil, as fuel for its combined steam and electricity power station; 
most of the energy produced there was used by the refinery itself, but surplus electricity was 
sold to other industries or to an electricity company. The Public Prosecutor took the view that 
the petroleum coke constituted waste subject to Legislative Decree No 22/97 and, since it was 
being stored and used without the administrative permit required by that legislation, charged 
both persons with having failed to comply with that permitting requirement. In addition the 
investigating judge sequestrated at the request of the Public Prosecutor the two petroleum 
coke depots which supplied the refinery’s combined heat and power station. After the entry 
into force of the amending Legislative Decree’s op 7 March 2002 – that removed petroleum 
coke used as industrial fuel from the scope of Legislative Decree No 22/97 – and the Law op 
6 May 2002 – that stated that petroleum coke used as fuel for production purposes was 
excluded from the scope of Legislative Decree No 22/97 and indicated that Petroleum coke 
may also be used at production sites in combustion processes intended to generate electrical 
or thermal energy for purposes no directly related to refining processes, provided that 
emissions do not exceed the limits fixed by  the relevant provisions -  the public prosecutor 
ended the sequestration, since the new Italian legislation authorised the use of petroleum coke 
under certain conditions. The Court ruled that: “Petroleum coke which is produced 
intentionally or in the course of producing other petroleum fuels in an oil refinery and is 
certain to be used as fuel to meet the energy needs of the refinery and those of other industries 
does not constitute waste within the meaning of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 
1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC op 18 March 1991.” Now that 
the limitation of the scope of Italian waste legislation – and the resulting decriminalization – 
in this case did not turn out to be contrary to European waste law, the criminal investigation 
probably had to be discontinued. Should the Court have given the opposite answer, this would 
probably not have led to a different conclusion, since “a directive cannot, of itself and 
independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the 
effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in 
contravention of the provisions of that directive (see, inter alia, Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis 
 
8 ECJ, 15 January 2004, Saetti and Frediani, Case C-235/02, ECR, 2004, p. I- 1005 
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Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13, and Case C-168/95, Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, 
paragraph 37).”9
 
 
 
9. The Lirussi and Bizzaro case10 concerns questions referred by the Pretore di Udine for 
a preliminary ruling. Those questions were raised in criminal proceedings instituted against 
Mr Lirussi and Mrs Bizzaro, who were charged with having stored waste under improper 
conditions. In the criminal proceedings brought against Mr Lirussi and Mrs Bizzaro, the 
Public Prosecutor pointed out that the unauthorised storage of which the defendants were 
accused could, in both cases, be regarded as `temporary storage' within the meaning of the 
Italian legislation and, as such, exempt from authorisation since the time-limits and maximum 
quantities provided for in respect of such storage were not exceeded. Although he considered 
that the defendants' conduct was therefore not punishable as a criminal offence, the Public 
Prosecutor none the less requested that a question be referred to the Court for a preliminary 
ruling in order to determine whether the national legislation is compatible with the provisions 
of Community law and whether the conduct in question could be regarded as constituting 
`temporary storage'. The Court answered the questions as follows: " 1. The concept of 
`temporary storage' of waste is distinct from that of `storage pending further operations' and 
does not fall within the definition of `waste management' within the meaning of Article 1(d) of 
Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 
91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991. 2. The national competent authorities are required to ensure 
that temporary storage operations comply with the obligations resulting from Article 4 of 
Directive 75/442."   
 This judgment, too, offers a useful clarification of the European Waste Directive. 
Insofar as point 2 of the operative part of the judgment of the Court of Justice is complied 
with, Italian waste legislation is also compatible in this respect with European waste law. If 
the answer of the Court had been different, the question could once more come up, as in the 
previous two cases, what the implications might be for the case pending before the national 
court. 
 
  
 
10.  The Fornasar case11 concerns questions referred by the Pretura Circondariale di 
Udine (Sezione Distaccata di Cividale del Friuli) for a preliminary ruling. Those questions 
were raised in criminal proceedings brought against Messrs Fornasar, Strizzolo, Toso, 
Mucchino, Peressutti and Chiarcosso, who were charged with having released toxic-harmful 
waste under the description special waste contrary to the legislation in force at the material 
time (1994). The accused were charged on the basis of those rules. However, under Article 2 
of the Italian Criminal Code which provides that 'no person may be punished for an action 
which, in accordance with a subsequent law, does not constitute an offence, the national court 
must ascertain whether the material seized may still be classified as hazardous waste under 
the current rules, as they were amended by Ministerial Decree No 141 of 11 March 1998. 
According to an expert's report produced for the national court, the substance at issue in this 
case is either a non-halogenated organic substance not employed as a solvent (No 20 in Annex 
G to Legislative Decree No 389/97, which corresponds to No 20 of Annex I.B of Directive 
91/689), or other waste containing any of the constituents listed in Annex H to Legislative 
 
9 Idem, paragraph 25. 
10 ECJ, 9 October 1999, P. Lirussi and F. Bizzaro, Joined Cases C-175/98 and C- 177/98, ECR, 1999, p. I- 6881. 
11 ECJ, 22 June 2000, Fornasar, Case C-318/98. 
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Decree No 389/97 and displaying any of the properties listed in Annex I to that Legislative 
Decree (No 40 of Annex G to Legislative Decree No 389/97, which corresponds to No 40 of 
Annex I.B to Directive 91/689), composed of isocyanates (No C37 of Annex H to Legislative 
Decree No 389/97 which corresponds to No C37 of Annex II to Directive 91/689) at a level of 
concentration such as to render it classifiable as harmful (No H5 of Annex I to Legislative 
Decree of 389/97, which corresponds to No H5 of Annex III to Directive 91/689). The expert 
found that, bearing in mind the nature of the place from which the substance was removed for 
dumping, the only reasonable working hypothesis as to its use was that of local foaming for 
heat isolation purposes. The only heading of the national rules and the list of hazardous 
wastes under which the substance might fall was No 080402, 'Waste adhesives and sealants 
free of halogenated solvents, in group 0804, 'Wastes from the MFSU (manufacture, 
formulation, supply and use) of adhesive and sealants (including water-proofing products). He 
none the less observed that it would be excessive, from a technical point of view, to include 
foaming for heat isolation purposes under that heading. In any event, the available documents 
were not sufficient to prove that that was the original intended use of the substance. 
Therefore, it was not possible to identify the origin or genesis of the waste. In order to 
ascertain whether the material seized can still be classified as hazardous waste under the rules 
currently in force, the Pretura Circondariale di Udine, Sezione Distaccata di Cividale del 
Friuli, decided to stay proceedings and to refer six questions to the Court. The Court answered 
those questions as follows: "1. Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on 
hazardous waste does not prevent the Member States, including, for matters within their 
jurisdiction, the courts, from classifying as hazardous waste other than that featuring on the 
list of hazardous waste laid down by Council Decision 94/904/EC of 22 December 1994 
establishing a list of hazardous waste pursuant to Article 1(4) of Council Directive 91/689, 
and thus from adopting more stringent protective measures in order to prohibit the 
abandonment, dumping or uncontrolled disposal of such waste. If they do so, it is for the 
authorities of the Member State concerned which have competence under national law to 
notify the Commission of such cases in accordance with the second indent of Article 1(4) of 
Directive 91/689. 2. Article 1(4) of Directive 91/689 and Decision 94/904 must be interpreted 
as meaning that it is not a necessary precondition for waste to be classified, in a specific case, 
as hazardous, that its origin be determined.” In view of these answers, it may be assumed 
that the criminal case has been settled in the proper manner. 
 
 
11. The Niselli case12 concerns questions referred by the Tribunale di Terni (Italy) for a 
preliminary ruling. The reference was made in the course of criminal proceedings against Mr 
Niselli, who is accused of having managed waste without the prior authorisation of the 
competent authority. After the entry into force of Decree-Law No 138/02, the Tribunale 
penale di Terni (Criminal Court, Terni) is asking, in essence, whether the authentic 
interpretation of waste given in Article 14 of Decree-Law No 138/02 could be contrary to 
Directive 75/442. According to that interpretation, the facts with which Mr Niselli is charged 
no longer constitute an offence, because the scrap metal seized was intended to be reused and 
could not therefore be described as waste. However, if that interpretation is incompatible with 
Directive 75/442, the criminal proceedings must continue on the basis of the offence charged. 
While noting that the Commission has initiated a procedure against the Italian Republic for 
failure to fulfil its obligations under Directive 75/442, the Tribunale penale di Terni decided 
to stay the proceedings and to refer some questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling. The 
answer of the Court reads as follows: “1. The definition of waste in the first subparagraph of 
 
12 ECJ, 11 November 2004, Antonio Niselli, Case C-457/02. 
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Article 1(a) of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by 
Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 and by Commission Decision 96/350/EC of 
24 May 1996, cannot be construed as covering exclusively substances or objects intended for, 
or subjected to, the disposal or recovery operations mentioned in Annexes II A and II B to 
that directive or in the equivalent lists, or to which their holder intends or is required to 
subject them. 2. The meaning of waste for the purposes of the first subparagraph of Article 
1(a) of Directive 75/442, as amended by Directive 91/156 and by Decision 96/350, is not to 
be interpreted as excluding all production or consumption residues which can be or are 
reused in a cycle of production or consumption, either without prior treatment and without 
harm to the environment, or after undergoing prior treatment without, however, requiring a 
recovery operation within the meaning of Annex II B to that directive.” Although the 
judgment of the Court is naturally of great significance for the interpretation of the waste 
concept, the question comes up once again what the referring court is supposed to do with the 
answer. In the words of the Court, “In that regard, it must be noted that a directive may 
indeed not of itself impose obligations on a private individual and may not therefore be relied 
on as such against him (see, among others, Case C-343/98 Collino and Chiappero [2000] 
ECR I6659, paragraph 20). Likewise, a directive cannot, of itself and independently of a 
national rule of law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of 
determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention 
of the provisions of that directive (see, in particular, Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen 
[1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13, and Case C168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I4705, paragraph 
37).” 
 
 
 
III. Administrative cases 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
12. The case-law shows that the administrative courts, too, can be confronted in different 
ways with the application of European waste law. A distinction can be made between cases 
where the administrative court is asked to review national administrative regulations for 
compatibility with European waste law – and where appropriate to annul the national 
regulations that are incompatible with that law – (3.2) and cases where European waste law is 
relevant to reviewing the legality of individual administrative decisions, such as 
environmental licences (3.3) or other government decisions (3.4). 
 
 
3.2. National regulations that are incompatible with European waste law 
 
 
 
13. The Inter-Environnement Wallonie case13 concerns questions referred by the Belgian 
Council of State for a preliminary ruling. Those questions were raised in proceedings brought 
by Inter-Environnement Wallonie, a non-profit-making association, for annulment of the 
Order of the Walloon Regional Government of 9 April 1992 on toxic or hazardous waste. 
 
13 ECJ, 18 December 1997, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL,  Case C-129/96 
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Article 5 (1) of that Order provided that: “Authorization is required for the setting-up and 
running of an installation intended specifically for the collection, pre-treatment, disposal or 
recovery of toxic or dangerous waste which is not an integral part of an industrial production 
process.” Consequently, no special licence was required for such installations if they formed 
an integral part of an industrial production process. The Council of State doubted whether 
Article 5 (1) of the Order was indeed in conformity with Article 11 of Directive 75/442, as 
amended, in conjunction with Article 3 of Directive 91/689. Finding that the Order was 
adopted at a time when the period allowed by the directive for its transposition had not yet 
expired, the Council of State questioned also to what extent a Member State may, during that 
period, adopt a measure contrary to the directive. The European Court of Justice answered 
these questions as follows: “1. A substance is not excluded from the definition of waste in 
Article 1 (a) of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by 
Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991, merely because it directly or indirectly 
forms an integral part of an industrial production process. 2. The second paragraph of Article 
5 and the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, and Directive 91/156, require the 
Member States to which that directive is addressed to refrain, during the period laid down 
therein for its implementation, from adopting measures liable seriously to compromise the 
result prescribed.” After having received the answer to the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling, the Council of State did indeed partly annul Article 5 (1) of the Order of 
the Walloon Government of 9 April 1992. The words “which is not an integral part of an 
industrial productions process”14 were annulled by a judgment of 25 January 200115. 
Consequently, the special licensing system henceforth also applies for installations integrated 
in the production process for the disposal of toxic or dangerous waste. 
 
 
 
14. Another example is the Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft case16. The 
Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Germany) referred questions for a preliminary ruling in 
proceedings brought by Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co. and S. Spitz KG, which 
are Austrian drinks producers, against Land Baden-Württemberg.  The claimants exported 
carbonated soft drinks, fruit juices, other non-carbonated drinks and table water to Germany, 
in non-reusable recoverable packaging. With a view to recovery of that packaging, they joined 
the global waste-collection system operated by the company Der Grüne Punkt - Duales 
System Deutschland AG and on that basis were exempted from the obligation to charge the 
deposit laid down in Paragraph 8(1) of the German Packaging Regulation for drinks 
distributed in Germany in non-reusable packaging. The German Government announced on 
28 January 1999 that in 1997 the proportion of reusable drinks packaging fell below 72% for 
the first time, namely to 71.33%. Since over two consecutive periods, namely between 
February 1999 and January 2000 and between May 2000 and April 2001, this proportion 
remained below 72% throughout Federal territory, on 2 July 2002 the Government announced 
pursuant to Paragraph 9(3) of the Packaging Regulation that from 1 January 2003 a 
mandatory deposit would be charged on mineral water, beer and soft drinks. Under the 
Packaging Regulation the claimants in the main proceedings would therefore be required from 
that date to charge the deposit prescribed in Paragraph 8(1) thereof on most of their packaging 
for drinks distributed in Germany and then to accept the return of, and recover, the empty 
 
14 “non intégrées dans un processus de production industrielles” 
15 Council of State, n° 92.669, 25 January 2001, l’Association sans but lucratif Inter-Environnement Wallonie, 
http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/
16 ECJ, 14 December 2004, Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbh & C° and S. Spiz KG v. Land Baden-
Württemberg, Case C-309/02. 
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packaging. The claimants in the main proceedings brought an action against Land Baden-
Württemberg before the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Administrative Court, Stuttgart) in 
which they submit that the rules laid down in the German Packaging Regulation on quotas for 
reusable packaging and the related deposit and return obligations are contrary to Articles 1(1) 
and (2), 5, 7 and 18 of Directive 94/62 and Article 28 EC. The questions raised by the 
referring court were answered by the Court of Justice as follows: “1. Article 1(2) of European 
Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and 
packaging waste does not preclude the Member States from introducing measures designed to 
promote systems for the reuse of packaging. 2. While Article 7 of Directive 94/62 does not 
confer on the producers and distributors concerned any right to continue to participate in a 
given packaging-waste management system, it precludes the replacement of a global system 
for the collection of packaging waste with a deposit and return system where the new system 
is not equally appropriate for the purpose of attaining the objectives of that directive or 
where the changeover to the new system does not take place without a break and without 
jeopardising the ability of economic operators in the sectors concerned actually to participate 
in the new system as soon as it enters into force. 3. Article 28 EC precludes national rules, 
such as those laid down in Paragraphs 8(1) and 9(2) of the Verordnung über die Vermeidung 
und Verwertung von Verpackungsabfällen (Regulation on the Avoidance and Recovery of 
Packaging Waste), when they announce that a global packaging-waste collection system is to 
be replaced by a deposit and return system without the producers and distributors concerned 
having a reasonable transitional period to adapt thereto and being assured that, at the time 
when the packaging-waste management system changes, they can actually participate in an 
operational system”. Having regard to the second and third answers of the Court, the referring 
court will have to sustain the action of the claimants. 
 
 
3.3. European waste law and the legality of licences 
 
 
 
15. The Palin Granit Oy case17 concerns an administrative dispute in connection with the 
granting of an environmental licence. It involves a reference for a preliminary ruling by the 
Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court of Finland). Those questions were 
raised in appeal proceedings challenging the grant of an environmental licence by the 
Vehmassalo public-health municipal joint board to the Palin Granit Oy company to operate a 
granite quarry. Under Finnish law, the municipal authorities are not competent to grant an 
environmental licence for a landfill and, consequently, the outcome of the main proceedings 
depended on whether leftover stone resulting from stone quarrying was to be regarded as 
waste or not. The Court answered the questions as follows: “1. The holder of leftover stone 
resulting from stone quarrying which is stored for an indefinite length of time to await 
possible use discards or intends to discard that leftover stone, which is accordingly to be 
classified as waste within the meaning of Council Directive 75/442/EEG of 15 July 1975 on 
waste. 2. The place of storage of leftover stone, its composition and the fact, even if proven, 
that the stone does not pose any real risk to human health or the environment are not relevant 
for determining whether the stone is to regarded as waste.” The Supreme Administrative 
Court found subsequently that left-over rock which was stored was to be considered as waste, 
as is specified in the judgement of the ECJ. While the case was pending, the Finnish 
legislation on environmental protection had undergone a total reform. The Supreme 
 
17 ECJ, 18 April 2002, Palin Granit Oy and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus, Case C-
9/00, ECR, 2002, I-3533. 
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Administrative Court did not regard the storage area as a landfill and, hence, the regional 
environmental centre was not the competent permit authority. Therefore, the judgement of the 
administrative court was repealed and the case was sent back to the municipal permit 
authority, but it was to consider the case by applying the new Environmental Protection Act 
(2000)18 . 
 
 
 
16. A similar case is the AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy case19, which also concerns questions 
referred by the same Finnish Supreme Administrative Court for a preliminary ruling. 
AvestaPolarit operated a mine whose principal product is chromium. The firm brought 
proceedings against the conditions of operation of that mine imposed on it by Lapland 
Environment Centre. By decision of 16 June 1999, the Environment Centre granted the 
environment licence sought by AvestaPolarit, subject however to certain conditions connected 
with the fact that it regarded the leftover rock and ore-dressing sand as waste to which the 
procedures laid down by Law 1072/1993 applied. AvestaPolarit appealed to the Supreme 
Administrative Court against that decision, seeking deletion on the ground of lack of legal 
basis of all the conditions attached to the licence concerning leftover rock and ore-dressing 
sand based on the classification of those materials as waste and of the places where they were 
stored as landfill sites. It submits that leftover rock and ore-dressing sand do not constitute 
waste within the meaning of Law 1072/1993. The European Court of Justice answered the 
questions as follows: “1. In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the 
holder of leftover rock and residual sand from ore-dressing operations from the operation of 
a mine discards or intends to discard those substances, which must consequently be classified 
as waste within the meaning of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as 
amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991, unless he uses them lawfully 
for the necessary filling in of the galleries of that mine and provides sufficient guarantees as 
to the identification and actual use of the substances to be used for that purpose. 2. In so far 
as it does not constitute a measure of application of Directive 75/442, as amended by 
Directive 91/156, and in particular Article 11 of that directive, national legislation must be 
regarded as other legislation within the meaning of Article 2 (1) (b) of that directive covering 
a category of waste mentioned in that provision, if it relates to the management of that waste 
as such within the  meaning of Article 1(d) of Directive 75/442, and if it results in a level of 
protection of the environment at least equivalent to that aimed at by that directive, whatever 
the date of its entry into force.” The Supreme Administrative Court held subsequently that 
boulders with a volume of 1.5-5 m3 which were stockpiled in an area belonging to the mining 
site about one year as a maximum and immediately thereafter used for production, were not to 
be classified as waste, because they were at least primarily reused and could be reused in the 
production process without any prior processing measures. Smaller boulders, ore-dressing 
sand etc. were not to be classified as waste if the conditions defined above were fulfilled. 
Even if there was evidence that a part of that material could be reused for producing certain 
objects of steatite or to be sold to other companies, a considerable part of the material which 
was stored was to be regarded as waste. Because the company had not presented any detailed 
plan for reuse, the permit decision was in part repealed and the case remanded back to the 
permit authority, which was to, after the hearing of the company who should produce a plan 
for reuse, reconsider certain permit provisions20. 
 
 
18 Information supplied by K. Kuusiniemi (31.10.2005). 
19 ECJ, 11 September 2003, AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy, formerly Outokumpu Chrome Oy, Case C-114/01. 
20 K. Kuusiniemi, EUFJE Questionnaire concerning EU Waste Law, 30.09.2005, p.3 
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17. The Commune de Braine-le-Château case21 also concerns a review of the legality of an 
environmental licence. The questions arose in the course of actions brought before the Conseil 
d’Etat (Council of State) (Belgium) by, respectively, the commune of Braine-le-Château (C-
53/02) and Mr Tillieut, the “association des habitants de Louvain-la-Neuve” ASBL and Mr 
Grégoire (C-217/02) against the Région wallonne (the Walloon Region) concerning permits to 
operate waste disposal sites. By a decision of 21 May 1999, the Walloon Government granted 
BIFFA Waste Services SA a permit to extend and operate a landfill in Braine-le-Château 
(Belgium). The commune of Braine-le-Château, supported by Mr Feron and Mr De Codt, 
brought an action before the Council of State for annulment of the permit issued on 21 May 
1999. In support of its application, it alleges, among other things, infringement of Articles 4, 
5, 7 and 9 of the Directive 75/442/EEC. It submits that, despite Article 7 of the Directive and 
Article 24(2) of a Regional Decree, the Walloon Government had not adopted any waste 
management plan on the date when that permit was issued. By Ministerial Order of 16 
December 1998, Propreté, Assainissement, Gestion de l'environnement SA (PAGE) was 
issued a permit to continue to operate a landfill at Les trois burettes in Mont Saint-Guibert 
(Belgium). That order lays down aftercare conditions and sets up a support committee and a 
scientific committee for the landfill. Mr Tillieut and Others and the association l'Épine 
blanche ASBL brought actions before the Council of State for the annulment of the 
Ministerial Order. Mr Tillieut and Others claim that the permit granted under the Order was 
issued for a site not listed in a plan for waste disposal sites, contrary to Articles 7(1) and 9 of 
the Directive and Article 24(2) of the Regional Decree. The Court of Justice answered the 
questions referred by the Council of State as follows: “1) Article 7 of Council Directive 
75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 
March 1991, must be interpreted to mean that the management plan or plans which the 
competent authorities of the Member States are required to draw up under that provision 
must include either a geographical map specifying the exact location of waste disposal sites 
or location criteria which are sufficiently precise to enable the competent authority 
responsible for issuing a permit under Article 9 of the Directive to determine whether the site 
or installation in question falls within the management framework provided for by the plan. 2) 
Article 7(1) of Directive 75/442, as amended by Directive 91/156, must be interpreted as 
requiring Member States to draw up waste management plans within a reasonable period, 
which may go beyond the time-limit for transposing Directive 91/156 laid down in the first 
subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the latter. 3) Articles 4, 5 and 7 of Directive 75/442, as 
amended by Directive 91/156, read in conjunction with Article 9 thereof, must be interpreted 
as not precluding a Member State which has not adopted, within the period prescribed, one 
or more waste management plans relating to suitable sites or installations for waste disposal 
from issuing individual permits to operate such sites and installations.” In view of the latter 
answer, the Council of State dismissed the actions for annulment of the permit that was 
granted, insofar as they are based on the absence of a waste management plan in accordance 
with the requirements of the Directive22. However, the case has not been settled conclusively 
yet, since the Council of State now wants to give the parties the opportunity to define their 
position on the pertinence of referring to the Court of Arbitration for a preliminary ruling, 
having regard to judgment no. 59/2005 of the Court of Arbitration of 16 March 2005, where 
the Court in another case gave a negative answer to a similar question, ruling that there had 
been no violation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination23. 
 
21 ECJ, 1 April 2004, Commune de Braine-le-Château, Michel Tillieut and Others v. Région wallonne, Joined 
cases C-53/02 and C-217/02. 
22 Council of State, la Commune de Braine-le-Château, N° 147.570, 11 July 2005, p. 7  
23 Court of Arbitration, no. 59/2005, 16 March 2005, www.arbitrage.be
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3.4. European waste law and the legality of other government decisions 
 
 
18. The Mayer Parry Recycling Ltd case24 concerns questions referred by the High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court). Those 
questions were raised in proceedings between Mayer Parry Recycling Ltd and the 
Environment Agency concerning the latter's refusal to grant Mayer Parry's application for 
accreditation as a reprocessor, which is defined as a person who carries out the activities of 
waste recovery or recycling. Mayer Parry is a company which specialises in the treatment of 
scrap metal so as to render it suitable for use by steelmakers for the purpose of producing 
steel. Mayer Parry obtains scrap metal, which includes packaging waste, from industrial and 
other sources. The scrap metal has commercial value and Mayer Parry generally has to pay to 
obtain it. Mayer Parry collects, inspects, tests for radiation, sorts, cleans, cuts, separates and 
shreds (fragmentises) the scrap metal. Through this process, Mayer Parry transforms ferrous 
scrap metal into material which meets the specifications of Grade 3B (Grade 3B material). It 
sells the Grade 3B material to steelmakers, which use it to produce ingots, sheets or coils of 
steel.  Mayer Parry applied to the Environment Agency for accreditation as a reprocessor 
entitled to issue PRNs (Packaging Waste Recovering Notes) under the voluntary scheme 
established by the Environment Agency and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, as 
set out in the so-called Orange Book. The Agency refused the application by decision of 15 
November 1999. Mayer Parry brought judicial review proceedings before the High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court), seeking, inter 
alia, the annulment of that decision and a declaration that it carries out recovery and recycling 
within the meaning of Directive 94/62. The High Court states that, during the course of the 
proceedings before it, it has become apparent that it is necessary to establish whether the 
activities carried out by Mayer Parry do or do not constitute recycling within the meaning of 
Directive 94/62. The questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling were 
answered as follows: "1. Recycling within the meaning of Article 3(7) of European Parliament 
and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste is 
to be interpreted as not including the reprocessing of metal packaging waste when it is 
transformed into a secondary raw material such as material meeting the specifications of 
Grade 3B, but as covering the reprocessing of such waste when it is used to produce ingots, 
sheets or coils of steel. 2. That interpretation would be no different if the concepts of recycling 
and waste referred to by Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste were taken 
into account." 
 In view of the answer of the Court of Justice, there was no way the claimant could be 
accredited as a reprocessor. This is probably the reason why the claimant discontinued its 
action in December 2003, so that the national court no longer needed to pass judgment25. 
 
 
 
19.      In the Enichem Base case26, the Court answered questions raised before the Tribunale 
amministrativo regionale per la Lombardia in proceedings brought by several producers of 
plastic containers, wrappings and bags against the Municipality of Cinisello Balsamo 
 
24 ECJ, 19 June 2003, The Queen on the application of Mayer Parry Recycling Ltd and Environment Agency v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Case C-444/00. 
25 Information obtained from Lord Justice Carnwath (26.10.2005). 
26 ECJ, 13 July 1989, Enichem Base and others v. Comune di Cinisello Balsamo, Case 380/87, ECR, 1989, 2491. 
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concerning the decision of the Mayor of that municipality of 16 February prohibiting the 
supply to consumers of non-biodegradable bags and other containers in which to carry away 
their purchases and the sale or distribution of plastic bags, with the exception of those 
intended for the collection of waste. The companies Enichem Base, Montedipe, Solvay, SIPA 
Industriale, Altene, Neophane and Polyflex Italiana brought an action before the Tribunale 
amministrativo regionale for the annulment of that decision. They also asked that the 
operation of the decision be suspended. Since the plaintiffs had claimed in support of their 
applications for annulment that the decision in question was contrary to Community law, the 
national court stayed the proceedings and referred four questions to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling. The ECJ answered as follows: “( 1 ) Directive 75/442, properly construed, 
does not give individuals the right to sell or use plastic bags and other non-biodegradable 
containers. ( 2 ) Article 3(2 ) of Directive 75/442 must be interpreted as requiring Member 
States to inform the Commission of any draft rules such as those at issue in the main 
proceedings, prior to their final adoption. ( 3 ) Article 3(2 ) of Directive 75/442, properly 
construed, does not give individuals any right which they may enforce before national courts 
in order to obtain the annulment or suspension of national rules falling within the scope of 
that provision on the ground that the rules were adopted without having been previously 
communicated to the Commission of the European Communities.” On the basis of the answers 
of the Court of Justice, in particular the third answer, it may reasonably be assumed that the 
referring court dismissed the action for annulment filed by the claimants. 
 
 
 
20. In the Comitato case27, the Tribunale Amminstrativo Regionale, Lombardia (Italy) 
referred to the Court five questions on the interpretation of Council Directive 75/442/EEC. 
Those questions were raised in proceedings between a group known as Comitato di 
Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and several individuals, on the one hand, and the 
Lombardy Region, on the other, concerning the latter' s decision to site a waste tip within its 
territory. The Giunta Regionale of the Lombardy Region approved, by various decisions in 
1989 and 1990, a plan for a tip for solid urban waste to be established in a municipality within 
the region.  A number of individuals instituted proceedings against those decisions, claiming 
that they undermined their rights regarding protection of the environment. The national court 
before which the action was brought, having found that the national rules implementing the 
directive (Decree No 915 of the President of the Italian Republic of 10 September 1982, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana No 343 of 15 December 1982, p. 9071) provided 
for the disposal of waste almost exclusively by means of tipping, expressed doubts as to the 
compatibility of those rules with the directive, which required the Member States to adopt 
appropriate measures to encourage the prevention, recycling and processing of waste.  The 
ECJ answered the questions as follows: “Article 4 of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 
July 1975 on waste does not confer on individuals rights which the national courts must 
safeguard”. It may therefore be assumed that European waste law played no significant part in 
the further settlement of this case by the national court.  
 
 
 
27 ECJ, 23 February 1994, Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others v. Regione 
Lombardia and others, Case C-236/92, ECR, 1994, I-483. 
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IV. Civil courts 
 
 
 
21. The Plato Plastik case28 concerns a reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Landesgericht Korneuburg (Austria). These questions have arisen in the context of an action 
brought by Plato Plastik Robert Frank GmbH (Plato Plastik), which manufactures and 
distributes plastic bags, against Caropack Handelsgesellschaft mbH (Caropack), which 
markets them, concerning the latter's refusal to provide confirmation that it has joined the 
system for the collection and recovery of packaging waste. Plato Plastik manufactures and 
distributes plastic carrier bags and tie bags. It supplies these bags direct to retailers or 
intermediaries. Caropack markets carrier bags supplied by Plato Plastik. Some of the bags are 
offered for sale in food supermarkets, where they hang near the checkouts and are handed to 
customers on request against separate payment. Among these bags are some which bear the 
logo Der Grüne Punkt, which indicates that the producer takes part in the system for the 
collection and recovery of packaging waste. Other bags are used in clothes shops. The shop 
assistant puts the purchased goods in the bag without the customer having to pay separately 
for the bag. Caropack also markets tie bags supplied by Plato Plastik. These are available to 
customers, free of charge, at the fruit and vegetable sections of food supermarkets. Customers 
put their purchases in them and weigh the goods. 17. By virtue of the 
Verpackungsverordnung, Plato Plastik is, as a producer of plastic bags, deemed to be a 
packaging producer with an obligation either to take back the packaging waste itself, free of 
charge, or to join a collection and recovery system. The collection and recovery system for 
transportation and sales packaging established by the Austrian Verpackungsverordnung is 
managed in Austria by a single company, Altstoffrecycling Austria Aktiengesellschaft 
(ARA). It appears from the file that undertakings which join the collection and recovery 
system set up by that company the ARA system') must pay a fee for doing so. Instead of 
joining the ARA system, Plato Plastik concluded an agreement transferring to Caropack its 
obligation to take back plastic bags. Plato Plastik considers that, on the basis of that 
agreement, Caropack undertook to give it in each case written confirmation that it had joined 
the collection and recovery system for the goods delivered to it. When the Austrian 
administrative authorities prosecuted Plato Plastik for not joining the ARA system, Plato 
Plastik requested confirmation from Caropack that the latter participated in the said system for 
plastic bags delivered to it. Caropack refused to give such confirmation on the ground that 
carrier bags are not packaging within the meaning of the Verpackungsverordnung and 
Directive 94/62 and that, therefore, it had no obligation to take them back. Caropack also 
questioned whether the ARA system was compatible with Community law. Plato Plastik 
appealed to the Landesgericht Korneuburg, seeking an order requiring Caropack, on the basis 
of the abovementioned agreement, to give it the confirmation in question. The Landesgericht 
Korneuburg considers that Caropack is not required to give the confirmation requested by 
Plato Plastik because the carrier bags referred to in the main proceedings are not packaging 
within the meaning of Directive 94/62 or because Plato Plastik is not deemed to be a 
packaging producer. In any case, according to the national court, there is no obligation to 
participate in the ARA system or to pay the fee in question in so far as the provisions of the 
Verpackungsverordnung are contrary to Community law. In those circumstances the 
Landesgericht Korneuburg decided to stay the proceedings and to refer different questions to 
the Court for a preliminary ruling. The Court answered these questions as follows: “1. Article 
                                                 
28 ECJ, 29 April 2004, Plato Plastik Robert Frank GmbH v Caropack Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-431/01 
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3(1) of European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on 
packaging and packaging waste must be interpreted as meaning that the plastic carrier bags 
handed to customers in shops, whether free of charge or not, constitute packaging within the 
meaning of that directive. 2. In the context of the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of 
Directive 94/62, producer' refers to the producer of the goods, not the manufacturer of the 
packaging products.” We do not know what further action the national court has taken in this 
case. Judging from the ruling given by the Court of Justice, it may reasonably be assumed that 
Plato Plastik should succeed in its action. 
 
 
  
 
V. The application of regulations 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 
22. Since a Regulation is directly applicable in domestic law, it may naturally be assumed 
that national courts would be confronted with the application of such regulations in cases that 
are referred to them. It is therefore not surprising that quite a few questions should be referred 
for a preliminary ruling in connection with the main Regulation on the subject of waste, 
namely Regulation No. 259/93. What is special about this Regulation is that, with respect to 
certain key concepts, such as “waste”, “disposal” and “recovery”, it refers to the definitions 
given in Directive 75/442/EEC, which means that the interpretation of that Directive is 
relevant to the interpretation of the Regulation. In the context of the Regulation, the concept 
of waste as laid down in the aforementioned Regulation does have direct effect, whereas this 
is not the case beyond that. Therefore quite a few questions are referred for a preliminary 
ruling in which some clarification is sought with respect to certain parts of the Regulation and 
of the Directive. 
 
 
4.2. Interpretation of Regulation No. 259/93 on the supervision and control of shipments of 
waste within, into and out of the European Community 
 
 
23.  The Dusseldorp case29 concerns questions referred by the Dutch Council of State for a 
preliminary ruling. Those questions were raised in proceedings between Chemische 
Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others and the Netherlands Minister for Housing, Regional 
Development and the Environment concerning exports to Germany of waste for recovery 
there. In 1994 Dusseldorp applied for authorisation to export to Germany two loads of oil 
filters and related waste. By two decisions the Minister raised objections to the export 
pursuant to the National Long-term Plan for the Disposal of Dangerous Waste and Article 7 
(2) and (4) (a) of the Council Regulation (EEC) N° 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the 
supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European 
Community. Dusseldorp and others brought subsequently an action before the Council of 
State seeking the annulment of the Minister’s decisions which, they maintain, are 
incompatible with the Community legislation. The court was uncertain as to whether the 
 
29 ECJ, 25 June 1998, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v. Minister van Volksgezondheid, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, Case C-203/96. 
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principles of self-sufficiency and proximity, as implemented in the Long- term Plan, could be 
applied to shipments of waste for recovery, and referred four questions to the Court of Justice. 
The Court answered these questions as follows: “1. Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 
1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 and Council 
Regulation (EEC) N° 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments 
of waste within, into and out of the European Community cannot be interpreted as meaning 
that the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity are applicable to shipments of waste for 
recovery. Article 130t of the EC treaty does not permit Member States to extend the 
application of those principles to such waste when it is clear that they create a barrier to 
exports which is not justified either by an imperative measure relating to protection of the 
environment or by one of the derogations provided for by Article 36 of that Treaty. 2. Article 
90 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with Article 86, precludes rules such as the Long-term 
Plan whereby a Member State requires undertakings to deliver their waste for recovery, such 
as oil filters, to a national undertaking on which it has conferred the exclusive right to 
incinerate dangerous waste unless the processing of their waste in another Member State is of 
a higher quality than that performed by that undertaking if, without any objective justification 
and without being necessary for the performance of a task in the general interest, those rules 
have the effect of favouring the national undertaking and increasing its dominant position.” 
Since the substance of the case concerned waste for recovery, the Council of State had no 
option but to annul the Minister’s decisions imposing the export ban30. 
 
 
 
24.  The Beside case31 concerns the interpretation of certain provisions of Regulation No 
259/93 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the 
European Community. Questions were referred by the Dutch Council of State in a case where 
Beside BV and its managing director, Mr Besselen, applied to the Council of State for the 
annulment of a decision taken by the Minister of Health, upholding an earlier decision 
obliging them to return waste to Germany which they had imported from Germany without 
prior notification. The applicants contended that the waste in question was mentioned on the 
green list of waste intended for recovery, so that no prior notification was required and 
consequently the decision to return the waste was also unlawful. The Court replied as follows: 
“1. The expression `municipal/household waste' referred to under AD 160 in the amber list in 
Annex III to Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and 
control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community, as amended 
by Commission Decision 94/721/EC of 21 October 1994 adapting, pursuant to Article 42(3), 
Annexes II, III and IV to Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93, includes both waste which for 
the most part consists of waste mentioned on the green list in Annex II to the Regulation, 
mixed with other categories of waste appearing on that list, and waste mentioned on the green 
list mixed with a small quantity of materials not referred to on that list. 2a. The reference to 
the storage of materials in point R 13 of Annex II B to Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 
July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991, must be 
interpreted as covering not only cases in which storage takes place in the undertaking in 
which the other operations mentioned in that annex must be carried out but also cases in 
which storage precedes transport to such an undertaking, regardless of whether the latter is 
established inside or outside the Community.  2b. The information listed in Article 11(1) of 
Regulation No 259/93 constitutes the minimum evidence which the competent authority may, 
 
30 Council of State, Administrative Section, 28 January 1999, N° E03.95.0106-A 
31 ECJ, 25 June 1998, Beside BV and I.M. Besselsen v. Minister van Volksgezondheid, Ruimtelijke Ordening en 
Milieubeheer, Case C-192/96. 
 20
                                                
in the absence of notification, require in order to establish that `green waste' is intended for 
recovery. 3. Regulation No 259/93 must be interpreted as meaning that the Member State of 
destination may not unilaterally return waste to the Member State of dispatch without prior 
notification to the latter; the Member State of dispatch may not oppose its return where the 
Member State of destination produces a duly motivated request to that effect.” Thereupon the 
Council of State considered that the waste can rightly be labelled as municipal/household 
waste, as included under AD 160 in the so-called amber list in Annex III to the Regulation 
and intended for recovery. It was a case of storage within the meaning of R13 in Annex IIB to 
the Directive, which means that notification was required for the transport of the waste at 
issue. Since no such notification had been given, it was a case of illicit trading, and a decision 
to return the waste was lawful subject to observance of the requirements of the Regulation in 
that respect.32
 
 
25. The Arco Chemie case33 bears many similarities with the Beside case. It concerns 
questions referred by the Dutch Council of State in cases where ARCO Chemie Nederland and 
Epon NV appealed against a decision in which the Minister and the Director of Environmental 
and Water Services respectively were of the opinion that “LUWA-bottoms” did and “wood 
chips” did not constitute waste within the meaning of the aforementioned Regulation and 
Directive 75/442/EEC. The Court answered those questions as follows: “[Case C-418/97] 1. It 
may not be inferred from the mere fact that a substance such as LUWA-bottoms undergoes an 
operation listed in Annex IIB to Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as 
amended by Council Directive91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991, that that substance has been 
discarded so as to enable it to be regarded as waste for the purposes of that directive. 2. For 
the purpose of determining whether the use of a substance such as LUWA-bottoms as a fuel is 
to be regarded as constituting discarding, it is irrelevant that that substance may be 
recovered in an environmentally responsible manner for use as fuel without substantial 
treatment. The fact that that use as fuel is a common method of recovering waste and the fact 
that that substance is commonly regarded as waste may be taken as evidence that the holder 
has discarded that substance or intends or is required to discard it within the meaning of 
Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, as amended by Directive 91/156. However, whether it is in 
fact waste within the meaning of the directive must be determined in the light of all the 
circumstances, regard being had to the aim of the directive and the need to ensure that its 
effectiveness is not undermined. The fact that a substance used as fuel is the residue of the 
manufacturing process of another substance, that no use for that substance other than 
disposal can be envisaged, that the composition of the substance is not suitable for the use 
made of it or that special environmental precautions must be taken when it is used may be 
regarded as evidence that the holder has discarded that substance or intends or is required to 
discard it within the meaning of Article 1(a) of that directive. However, whether it is in fact 
waste within the meaning of the directive must be determined in the light of all the 
circumstances, regard being had to the aim of the directive and the need to ensure that its 
effectiveness is not undermined. [Case C-419/97] 1. It may not be inferred from the mere fact 
that a substance such as wood chips undergoes an operation listed in Annex IIB to Directive 
75/442, as amended by Directive 91/156, that that substance has been discarded so as to 
enable it to be regarded as waste for the purposes of the directive. 2. The fact that a substance 
is the result of a recovery operation within the meaning of Annex IIB to that directive is only 
 
32 Council of State, Administrative Section, 29 April 1999, Nos. E03.95.1115-A and E03.95.1116-A. 
33 ECJ, 15 June 2000, ARCO Chemie Nederland v. Minister v. Volksgezondheid, Ruimtelijke Ordening en 
Milieubeheer e.a., Cases C-418/97 and C-419/97. 
 21
                                                
one of the factors which must be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining 
whether that substance is still waste, and does not as such permit a definitive conclusion to be 
drawn in that regard. Whether it is waste must be determined in the light of all the 
circumstances, by comparison with the definition set out in Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, 
as amended by Directive 91/156, that is to say the discarding of the substance in question or 
the intention or requirement to discard it, regard being had to the aim of the directive and the 
need to ensure that its effectiveness is not undermined. For the purpose of determining 
whether the use of a substance such as wood chips as a fuel is to be regarded as constituting 
discarding, it is irrelevant that that substance may be recovered in an environmentally 
responsible manner for use as fuel without substantial treatment. The fact that that use as fuel 
is a common method of recovering waste and the fact that that substance is commonly 
regarded as waste may be taken as evidence that the holder has discarded that substance or 
intends or is required to discard it within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, as 
amended by Directive 91/156. However, whether it is in fact waste within the meaning of that 
directive must be determined in the light of all the circumstances, regard being had to the aim 
of the directive and the need to ensure that its effectiveness is not undermined.” In view of 
this answer, it was for the referring court to ascertain whether or not the substances referred to 
in the lawsuits pending before it should be considered as waste on the basis of the criteria that 
the Court of Justice refers to in its answer to the questions referred to it for a preliminary 
ruling. The Council of State considered that the wood chips should be classed as waste from 
the moment they are accepted by EPON. Consequently, the two challenged decisions were 
found unlawful and annulled34. 
 
 
26. The Oliehandel Koeweit BV case is along the same lines35. It also involves cases 
where several companies appealed to the Dutch Council of State against ministerial decisions 
opposing the export of certain types of waste to Germany. In all those cases, the Minister was 
of the opinion that they involved the export of waste for disposal instead of waste for recovery 
as the firms claimed. The types of waste in question were waste oils to be used as fuel to 
generate energy for an oil refinery, adding fly ash to mortar and filling in galleries with that 
mortar, using fibreglass –E waste to fill in the spaces resulting from working a clay quarry, 
using a iron chloride solution in waste disposal facilities to stabilise the bonding of other 
metallic wastes, thereby facilitating the formation of a precipitate that is made into filter 
cakes, which are disposed of, and waste incinerator fly ash used in manufacturing concrete 
mortar. The Court answered the questions as follows: “1. Recovery operations involving the 
recycling or reclamation of metals and metal compounds or the recycling or reclamation of 
other inorganic materials, as referred to in operations R4 and R5, respectively, of Annex IIB 
to Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 
91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 and by Commission Decision 96/350/EC of 24 May 1996, may 
also cover the re-use referred to in Article 3(1)(b)(i) of that directive. Those operations do not 
necessarily imply that the substance in question undergoes processing, can be used several 
times or can subsequently be reclaimed. 2. A waste treatment operation may not be classified 
simultaneously as both disposal and recovery within the meaning of Directive 75/442, as 
amended by Directive 91/156 and by Decision 96/350. Where an operation, having regard 
solely to its wording, may a priori be covered by a disposal operation set out in Annex IIA to 
that directive or a recovery operation referred to in Annex IIB to that directive, it must be 
 
34  Council of State, Administrative Section, 29 June 2001, AB Rechtspraak Bestuursrecht 2001, 1244-1247. 
35 ECJ, 27 February 2003, Oliehandel Koeweit BV e.a. v. Minister v. Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en 
Milieubeheer,  Joined Cases C-307/00 tot C-311/00 
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determined on a case-by-case basis whether the main objective of the operation in question is 
that the waste should serve a useful purpose, by replacing the use of other materials which 
would have had to be used to fulfil that function, and in such a case to uphold the 
classification as recovery. 3. The classification chosen by the competent authorities of the 
Member State of destination as regards a given waste treatment operation does not prevail 
over the classification chosen by the competent authorities of the Member State of dispatch, 
any more than the classification chosen by the latter prevails over that chosen by the 
competent authorities of the Member State of destination. 4. It follows from the system put in 
place by Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and 
control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community that, when the 
competent authority of the Member State of dispatch forms the view that the purpose of a 
waste shipment has been incorrectly classified as recovery in the notification, that authority 
must base its objection to the shipment on the ground of that error in classification, without 
reference to a particular provision of that regulation which, such as Article 4(3)(b)(i) in 
particular, defines the objections which Member States may make to shipments of waste for 
disposal. 5. Having regard to Article 8(2)(b) of Council Directive 75/439/EEC of 16 June 
1975 on the disposal of waste oils, as amended by Council Directive 87/101/EEC of 22 
December 1986, the shipment of waste oils containing more than 50 ppm of PCB for use as a 
fuel constitutes illegal traffic in waste within the meaning of Article 26(1)(e) of Regulation No 
259/93, to which the competent authority is required to object on the ground solely of that 
illegality, without reference to any of the specific provisions of that regulation setting out the 
objections which Member States may raise to waste shipments.” 
 
 
 
27. The SITA EcoService Nederland BV case36, too, concerns questions referred by the 
Dutch Council of State in connection with a similar issue, except that this time it involved a 
ministerial objection to the export of waste to Belgium. The question actually was whether “a 
compact mixture of waste glue, sealant, resin and paint, as well as waste containing silicon 
mixed with sawdust” and “organic and inorganic sediments with a low halogen content, 
mixed with sawdust” used by a Belgian cement industry as “fuel in cement kilns and as raw 
material in the production of clinker by cement factories” had to be considered as waste 
intended for disposal or as waste intended for recovery. In the opinion of the Court, “1. Where 
a waste treatment process comprises several distinct stages, it must be classified as a disposal 
operation or a recovery operation within the meaning of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 
July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 and by 
Commission Decision 96/350/EC of 24 May 1996, for the purpose of implementing Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments 
of waste within, into and out of the European Community, as amended by Council Regulation 
(EC) No 120/97 of 20 January 1997, taking into account only the first operation that the 
waste is to undergo subsequent to shipment;2. The calorific value of waste which is to be 
combusted is not a relevant criterion for the purpose of determining whether that operation 
constitutes a disposal operation as referred to in point D10 of Annex IIA to Directive 75/442, 
as amended by Directive 91/156 and by Decision 96/350, or a recovery operation as referred 
to in point R1 of Annex IIB thereof. Member States may establish distinguishing criteria for 
that purpose, provided that those criteria comply with those laid down in the Directive.”. 
Thereupon the Council of State considered that the challenged decisions were unlawful since 
 
36 ECJ, 3 April 2003, SITA EcoService Nederland BV v.Minister v. Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en 
Milieubeheer, Case C-116/01 
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the waste had to be regarded as waste for recovery and also that the condition concerning the 
calorific value was unlawful. Consequently, the challenged decisions were annulled.37
 
 
28. The DaimlerChrysler case38 concerns questions referred by the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany). Those questions were raised in proceedings between 
DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler) and Land Baden-Württemberg concerning the 
legality of a decree of the Government and the Minister for the Environment and Transport of 
that Land making it compulsory to offer certain waste for disposal to an approved body. 
DaimlerChrysler disputed the legality of the Decree and, by application lodged on 4 
December 1996, requested the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg, Germany, to 
annul it. DaimlerChrysler maintained that it was harmed by the obligation to offer the special 
waste to an incineration centre in Hamburg, on the ground that it was thereby prevented from 
having the waste produced by its factories in Land Baden-Württemberg incinerated more 
cheaply abroad, particularly in Belgium. Shipping the waste to the Hamburg installation, over 
distances generally between 600 and 800 kilometres, caused it to incur additional costs of 
DEM 2.2 million each year. In support of its action, DaimlerChrysler claimed, inter alia, that 
the obligation laid down in the Decree to offer the waste to AVG's incineration centre is 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on exports prohibited by Article 34 of the EC Treaty 
(now, after amendment, Article 29 EC) and is contrary to the provisions of the Directive and 
the Regulation. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg held that the action for 
annulment was unfounded and dismissed it by judgment of 24 November 1997. By decision 
of 14 May 1998, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, on appeal by DaimlerChrysler, granted the 
latter leave to appeal on a point of law. The Court referred the questions to the Court of 
Justice, which gave the following answers: “1. Where a national measure generally 
prohibiting exports of waste for disposal is justified by the principles of proximity, priority for 
recovery and self-sufficiency, in accordance with Article 4(3)(a)(i) of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste 
within, into and out of the European Community, it is not necessary for that national measure 
to be subject to a further and separate review of its compatibility with Articles 34 and 36 of 
the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 29 EC and 30 EC). 2. Article 4(3) of 
Regulation No 259/93 does not authorise a Member State which has adopted legislation 
introducing an obligation to offer waste for disposal to an approved body to provide that, 
where the waste is not allocated to a treatment centre for which that body is responsible, its 
shipment to treatment installations in other Member States is authorised only on condition 
that the intended disposal satisfy the requirements of the environmental protection legislation 
of that Member State. 3. Articles 3 to 5 of Regulation No 259/93 preclude a Member State 
from applying to shipments between Member States of waste for disposal, before the 
implementation of the notification procedure laid down in the regulation, its own procedure 
in relation to the offer and allocation of the waste.” On the basis of the second and third 
answers in particular, the referring court had to alter the decision appealed against and to 
annul the challenged Decree. 
 
 
 
 
37 Council of State, Administrative Section, 22 October 2003, E03.99.00042 and E03.99.00043. 
38 ECJ, 13 December 2001, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-324/99, ECR, I-9897. 
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29. In the Abfall Service AG case39, the Court answered questions referred by the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria). Those questions were raised in proceedings between Abfall 
Service AG (ASA) and the Bundesminister für Umwelt, Jugend und Familie (BMU) 
concerning the legality of a decision by which the BMU had objected to a shipment of waste 
planned by ASA. The decision concerned a planned shipment of 7.000 tonnes of hazardous 
waste (slag and ashes produced as a by-product in the operation of waste incinerators into a 
specific product at a waste treatment plant in Vienna. The waste was to be deposited in former 
salt-mine in Germany, to secure hollow spaces (mine-sealing).” The ground for BMU’s 
objection was that the planned shipment was not a shipment of waste as a recovery operation, 
but constituted in fact a disposal operation referred to in D12 of Annex II A of Directive 
75/442/EEC. The Court answered these questions as follows:”1. It follows from the system 
established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision 
and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community, as 
amended by Commission Decision 98/368/EC of 18 May 1998, that the competent authority of 
dispatch, within the meaning of Article 2 (c) thereof, is competent to verify whether a 
proposed shipment classified in the notification as a shipment of waste for recovery does in 
fact correspond to that classification, and that, if that classification is incorrect, the authority 
must oppose the shipment by raising an objection founded on that misclassification within the 
period prescribed by Article 7 (2) of the Regulation.  2. The deposit of waste in a disused mine 
does not necessarily constitute a disposal operation for the purposes of D 12 of Annex II A to 
Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, as amended by Council Directive 
91/156/EEC op 18 March 1991 and Commission Decision 96/350/EC of 24 May 1996. The 
deposit must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the operation is a 
disposal or a recovery operation within the meaning of that Directive. Such a deposit 
constitutes a recovery if its principal objective is that the waste serves a useful purpose in 
replacing other materials which would have had to be used for that purpose.” The Court 
called upon the referring court to examine in the case at issue whether the principal objective 
of the deposit of the waste in the site of destination is that the waste serve a useful purpose in 
replacing other materials which would have had to be used for that purpose or not. If so, this 
would have to lead to an annulment of the challenged decision. If not, it would have to lead to 
a dismissal of the appeal lodged against the ministerial decision opposing the transport of the 
waste. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof eventually annulled the challenged decision because the 
Minister had failed in that particular case to verify whether the operation was a disposal or a 
recovery operation, since he had assumed that the deposit of waste in a disused mine always 
had to be considered as a form of waste disposal40. 
 
  
 
30. The EU-Wood-Trading case41 concerned questions referred by the 
Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany). The applicant took recourse against 
Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, regarding objections raised by 
the latter against the shipment of 3 500 tonnes of wood waste which EUWoodTrading was 
envisaging exporting to Italy. The waste in question consisted, particularly, of treated or 
painted wood from demolitions, from furniture or from joinery off-cuts. It was intended that it 
be recovered for the production of chipboard panels. The competent authority of dispatch 
 
39 ECJ, 27 February 2002, Abfall Service AG (ASA) v. Bundesminister für Umwelt, Jugend und Familie, Case C-
6/00. 
40 Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Zl. 2002/07/00035-19, 21 March 2002. 
41 ECJ, 16 December 2004, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft Rheinland-
Pfalz mbH, Case C-227/02 
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objected to that shipment under the first and second indents of Article 7(4)(a) of the 
Regulation. The objection was based on the fact that, in view of the lead content of the waste 
in question, which exceeded a reference value fixed in a guideline of the Environment 
Ministry of the Land Rhineland-Palatinate, the recovery of that waste could not be carried out 
without endangering human health and harming the environment, contrary to the requirements 
both of the Directive and of the Law of 27 September 1994. EUWoodTrading lodged an 
opposition with the competent authority of dispatch against those objections and produced 
another analysis of the waste showing, per kilogram of dry material, a lead content of 23 mg 
and an arsenic content of 3.4 mg. That opposition was rejected and EU WoodTrading 
appealed that decision. The Court answered the questions raised by the referring judge as 
follows: “1. The first indent of Article 7(4)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 
February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of 
the European Community, as amended by Commission Decisions 98/368/EC of 18 May 1998 
and 1999/816/EC of 24 November 1999, is to be interpreted as meaning that the objections to 
a shipment of waste for recovery which the competent authorities of dispatch and of 
destination are empowered to raise may be based on considerations connected not only to the 
actual transport of the waste in each competent authority's area of jurisdiction but also on the 
recovery planned for that shipment. 2. The first indent of Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation No 
259/93, as amended by Decisions 98/368 and 1999/816, is to be interpreted as meaning that 
for the purposes of an objection to a shipment of waste the competent authority of dispatch 
may, in assessing the effects on health and the environment of the recovery envisaged at the 
destination, provided it complies with the principle of proportionality, rely on the criteria to 
which, to avoid such effects, the recovery of waste is subject in the State of dispatch, even 
where those criteria are stricter than those in force in the State of destination. 3. The second 
indent of Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation No 259/93, as amended by Decisions 98/368 and 
1999/816, is to be interpreted as meaning that a competent authority of dispatch may not rely 
on those provisions to raise an objection to a shipment of waste based on the fact that the 
planned recovery does not comply with the national laws and regulations for protection of the 
environment, public order, public safety or health protection.” In view of these answers, in 
particular the answer under nos. 1 and 2, it may be assumed that the referring court eventually 
did not find the challenged decision unlawful. 
 
 
31. The Siomab SA case42 concerns questions referred by the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles 
(Belgium). The reference was made in the course of proceedings between Siomab SA and the 
Institut bruxellois pour la gestion de l'environnement (IBGE) concerning a shipment of waste 
that Siomab intended to make to Germany. Siomab operates an incineration plant for 
household waste and similar products in Brussels. The plant produces residues, in particular, 
salts. On 30 November 2001, Siomab concluded a contract with GTS-Grunde Teutschenthal 
Sicherungs GmbH & Co. KG for burying the salts in the galleries of the salt mines at 
Teutschenthal, in Germany. In order to ship that waste, Siomab sent the IBGE a notification 
file for transmission to the competent authority of destination, the Landesamt für Geologie 
und Bergwesen Sachsen-Anhalt. The IBGE took the view that the operation concerned was a 
shipment of waste for disposal of type D 12 Permanent storage (e.g. emplacement of 
containers in a mine, etc.), listed in Annex II A to the Directive. The German authority 
objected to the requested shipment on the ground that under national mining law only 
recovery, and not disposal, is permissible in the Teutschenthal mine.  Siomab brought an 
action before the Conseil d'État (Council of State) seeking annulment of the IBGE's decision 
 
42 ECJ, 19 October 2004, Siomab SA v. Institut bruxellois pour la gestion de l’environnement, Case-472/02. 
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to refuse to transmit a new notification of the shipment of waste to the competent authority of 
destination. In interlocutory proceedings, Siomab requested the President of the Tribunal de 
première instance de Bruxelles (Court of First Instance, Brussels), Belgium, to order the 
IBGE to transmit, without amendment, the new notification of the shipment of waste to the 
competent authority of destination. That request was rejected. Siomab lodged an appeal 
against that order with the Cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels), claiming, 
inter alia, that it was not for the IBGE to reclassify on its own initiative the purpose of the 
shipment of waste and that, in the context of the specific procedure for recovery operations, 
the Regulation does not empower the competent authority of dispatch to refuse to transmit the 
notification. The IBGE contended that, on the contrary, it had a duty to verify the 
classification of the planned shipment and that it was therefore not required to give 
notification in the case of abuse of the Regulation. The Court of Justice gave the following 
answer to the questions referred by the Court of Appeal: “Council Regulation (EEC) No 
259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into 
and out of the European Community, as amended by Commission Decision 98/368/EC of 18 
May 1998 and Commission Decision 1999/816/EC of 24 November 1999, is to be interpreted 
as meaning that, where a Member State has recourse, under Article 6(8) of that regulation, to 
the specific procedure whereby the competent authority of dispatch transmits the consignment 
note for a shipment of waste for recovery, that authority, if it considers it necessary to object 
to the shipment on the ground that it has been incorrectly classified by the notifier, may not 
reclassify the shipment on its own initiative and is required to transmit that document to the 
other competent authorities and the consignee. It is then for that authority to inform the 
notifier and the other competent authorities concerned of its objection by any appropriate 
means before the end of the period laid down in Article 7(2) of the Regulation at the latest.” 
This answer should normally bring the referring court to the conclusion that the Brussels 
environmental authority (the IBGE) had acted wrongly and was required to transmit the 
notification to the competent authority of the place of destination. The result will eventually 
probably be the same, however, since the IBGE upon receiving the reply from the competent 
authority of the place of destination could still object on the grounds that the waste had been 
wrongly classified as waste intended for recovery. After all, the answer of the Court of Justice 
does not suggest that the IBGE might have been mistaken on this point. 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 
 
32.  Our investigation of the case-law of the Court of Justice in connection with questions 
about European waste law referred for a preliminary ruling has shown that the circumstances 
in which national courts are confronted with the application of European waste law can differ 
considerably. 
As may be expected given the direct effect of Regulations, the national courts are 
confronted primarily with questions concerning the application and interpretation of 
Regulation (EEC) No. 259/93. Our investigation has revealed that it is administrative courts in 
particular that refer questions on this subject, although it is obvious that criminal courts, too, 
may be faced with such questions, at least insofar as breaches of the Regulation have been 
made punishable by the national authorities of Member States. What is special about the 
Regulation is that, as far as a number of key concepts are concerned, such as “waste”, 
“recovery” and “disposal”, it refers to concepts that are defined in Directive 75/442/EEC. As 
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a result, those concepts assume direct effect in the context of the Regulation, so that questions 
of interpretation may also arise in that connection in the context of the Regulation. 
Administrative courts are also confronted with the application of European waste law 
when they are asked to judge the legality of administrative regulations and other individual 
government decisions in fields covered by European waste directives. For example, questions 
may arise concerning the compatibility of those national regulations or of individual 
government decisions with either the minimum requirements of a directive – where a 
directive, like Directive 75/442/EEC, is intended to achieve minimum harmonization – or 
with the uniform requirements of the directive – where full harmonization is pursued as is the 
case, at least in certain parts, with Directive 94/62/EC. In the latter case, the question also 
usually comes up whether the national regulations are consistent with certain Treaty 
provisions, such as those that are intended to ensure the free movement of goods.  
Criminal courts, too, may be confronted with the application of European waste 
directives, in particular when they are asked to rule on the punishability of certain breaches of 
national waste legislation established in pursuance of the European directives. The 
interpretation of certain concepts from European waste law can be decisive for the 
interpretation of the corresponding concepts in domestic law. The survey given in this paper 
also shows that quite a few (Italian) criminal courts raise questions concerning limitations, 
contrary to European law, of the scope of national waste legislation and the decriminalization 
resulting from those limitations. Although those questions are important indicators of 
problems with the application of European waste directives in certain Member States and the 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling can contribute to a further clarification of European 
waste law by the Court of Justice, we may rightly question the relevance of such questions to 
the cases that have been submitted to the criminal courts. 
 Finally, it turns out that civil courts, too, are likely to deal with cases involving 
European waste law where this is decisive in establishing the various obligations of private 
parties. 
 All this illustrates that the national courts have an important task in enforcing 
European environmental law in general and waste law in particular. On this point, we may 
endorse the words of Gil Carlos RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS, former President of the European 
Court of Justice, “All national judges – tens of thousands of them – are competent to apply EC 
law on an everyday basis. They apply it directly; they interpret their national laws in 
conformity with it, if at all possible; if not, they must leave aside national laws that are 
contrary to EC law, because it is the duty of national judges to guarantee the rights provides 
for in the treaty and in EC legislation. In other words, individuals may rely upon provisions of 
Community law before national courts without any implementing element of domestic law, the 
only requirement being that the provisions relied upon should be sufficiently clear and 
unconditional to create such rights. The co-operation between the Court of Justice and the 
national courts through the preliminary reference procedure has been decisive to ensure the 
proper application of Community law and the protection of individual rights created by the 
Community legal order. The Court’s jurisprudence in the area of environmental protection 
shows particularly well the important role that national judges play in the implementation 
and enforcement of obligations created by Community directives.”43
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